Training Manuals?

[lew]

Does anyone have any French manuals from the period, whether they be complete or pieced together? Would any units be willing to share their SOP and tactics?

Merci.

Cordialement,

Steve

[slehman]

Gents

This thread is just about two years old, has anyone made any progress with either the acquisition or sourcing of period French tactical manuals?

We can have perfect impressions but the foundation of any accurate unit has to be period drills and tactics.

Steven

[slehman]

I've search a few sites where I have found other tactical manuals to no avail. Ideally we would track down a 'Guide de tactique d'infanterie' at the section commanders level.

Without going too far out on a limb, the principles of fire and movement were just about universal up until the 90's and changes were based on weapons and manning. One foot on the ground with the LMG group covering an assaulting rifle group didn't really change until the advent of assault rifles and the addition of a second LMG to the section. (Yes the Germans changed the tactic after Poland but that's another topic). Patrolling and ambushes hasn't really evolved nor have occupying a defensive position. With the close of the Second World War, how safe would I be to suggest that the French infantry tactics of the time were roughly based on American platoon and section tactics of WWII?

Before I am labeled a heretic, it is a question and not a suggestion. Cheers

Steven
(I've added the 'n' to my name as it seems our mothers were of the same mindset as well)

[lew]

Indeed. We could have been saddled with far, far worse names. At least yours is spelled with a "v" and not a "ph" like some other cretins.

It's no secret or point of shame that the French copied heavily, and unabashedly, from the US forces TOE, tactics, equipment, and SOPs, while still maintaining their own traditions and identities. The Colonial and Legion units were relatively undisturbed (i.e. not destroyed outright or shipped of to prison camps) by WW2, and most of their traditions survived intact. The Colonial airborne were raised under the guidance of the British SAS, so their uniforms and practices differed somewhat from the majority of the other units- Metropolitan airborne, armor, artillery, everything else- that was, by and large, reconstructed under US tutelage beginning with the raising and training of French forces in North Africa in 1943. The French standardized entirely on a US-based model- with their own refinements and peculiarities- in the early '50's.

Mick (Legion Etrangere, schmutz) posted a small unit (platoon-level) tactics guide somewhere around here. I believe it was just copied from a US Army FM. That's at least a great starting point that covers most of the topic. The rest is just filling in the time- and Franco-specific details.

I'm fortunate with 11e BPChoc- their missions mirrored somewhat closely that of LRRP's, Special Forces, and MACV SOG in the Second Indochina War. One should have pictured in mind the idea of a classical special operations force of the period with the following squad-level competencies and capabilities, plus a few more- demolition, amphibious and airborne ops, ambushing, intel gathering, long range recon, raiding. I've read about those aforementioned units extensively, so figuring out the applicable tactics and SOPs is not too challenging. The Commandos de l'Air shared a similar mission set, with the added core competency and specialty of close air support and combat control, much like a modern JTAC. The Commandos de Marine were much the same, with the added emphasis on amphibious operations, but they typically operated in larger field units than the latter two- platoon level and up.

[slehman]

Steve

Thank you, I'll keep searching the forum and see what I can't find from Legion Entrangere.

Noch ein mal, merci encore.

Steven

[lew]

De rien, camarade. Ce n'est pas une problème. I'm happy to help. A great thing about the few members active here is that, if we can't provide or find the information outright, we can bounce ideas back and forth to work it out.

I have the Word document saved on my work computer. Send me your e-mail in a private message and I can have that off to you. I may have looked right at it, but I searched every forum for the thread and didn't see it.

[slehman]

Merci comrade. I appreciate being on the forum. It's also refreshing to be somewhat on the ground floor of this time period. Respectfully I submit that we need a aide memoire for the basic grunt/poilu that has him act like the grunt he portrays. I've done many demonstrations in front of military personnel and when you put your name on something, you need to do it right. When we do this is front of an audience filled with brother soldiers and vets, we want them to say 'honey that's how it was' instead of 'what the frik was that?'

Years ago in the Second War period as a German we were working with vets to translate training manuals that would have practical applications at the section and platoon level. So much has been written on what the military considers UFI you could fill the Smithsonian. Now we have so many manuals translated that the average rifleman is overwhelmed with information, most of which is UFI and many pay grades above what we're portraying. Before the cornucopia spilled over we focused on four basic lectures: the section in the advance including formations and hand-signals; the section in the defence including duties of a sentry and preparing a trench; retrograde actions; and finally identify and communicate targets (so that every rifleman could direct section fire onto a target/GRIT). They were taught using basic military format and principles as we wanted to establish a training standard but above all 'Keep It Simple Soldier' (for the guys that understand the KISS rule). I prepped these for both our Second War German and Canadian sections.

Anyways gents, please forgive me if I have grabbed the podium, my last job in the military was as the standards CSM for what's now 'The Second Canadian Division'. I love what you guys have done with the time period and I speak out of absolute respect. I just want to ante up and contribute more to the team.

For your consideration
Steven

Steve, P.M. pending

[craigtx]

Also something to bear in mind is that the French were forced into using a lot of the US tactics and training and organization when the US took over equipping the French in 1943 before the start of the Italian Campaign. Basically it was a case of if'n you're gonna use our kit, you're gonna use it like we do. A common complaint until the end of the war was that the French wouldn't allocate enough troops for service roles as opposed to combat.

I'm all for upping our game. Don't worry about grabbin' the podium here Steve(n) we all do it/have done it here with alarmin' frequency.

[lew]

Jul 30, 2015 17:31:42 GMT -5 craigtx said:

I'm all for upping our game. Don't worry about grabbin' the podium here Steve(n) we all do it/have done it here with alarmin' frequency.

It's the only attention of any sort I ever get.

The French were actually enthusiastic adopters of US tactics and organization (It was certainly better than the mess they had going into the War. ). To their credit, they readily added their own refinements and created their own distinct military culture that persists to this day. The fact that the Colonial airborne and Commandos de Marines were both trained and equipped by the Brits but later transitioned to a US-style further reinforces the point.

[craigtx]

Awww... Poor you...


True enough...

[lew]

Pity me! I command it.

The same supply:combat ratio that was an issue in Indochina proved to be a huge asset in Algeria, which already had a well-developed and efficient logistics and maintenance capacity. Therefore, without a need to commit more service support troops, they could field larger amounts of infantry. The strategy worked briliantly despite some early challenges and the war would have been won had not de Gaulle thrown it away [In hindsight, it was likely the correct course of action, as France's economy boomed shortly thereafter.]

[slehman]

Gents:

Does anyone have an insight into this publication? I've ordered it today and I should have it in a few days. Once it arrives and I've had a chance to skim through it, I'll make comment.

quikmaneuvers.com/french_indochina_army_tactics.html

Steven

[craigtx]

Huh... First I've heard of this one... I'll be lookin' forward to your review.

[slehman]

They also have one on French fortifications of the Indochina war so once the first one meets the approval, I'll try the next.


At 50 posts I believe I went from the CP to en patrouille. Looking forward to the next posting milestone. Do we have a list somewhere?

Cheers
Steven

[craigtx]

Dunno...

[toussant]

Looks most interesting... I, too, would like to hear what you think of it when finished...
---Toussant

[lew]

Add me to the list of the eagerly waiting.

[slehman]

Me too, it might be a nice leg up towards developing some decent SOPs or an aide memoire. As soon as the manual is here, I'll start spreading the wealth.

Cheers

Steven

[lew]

Much appreciated. I think I can do a half-rate or better job with applicable small unit tactics, but having a concrete framework to deal with would be ideal.

[slehman]

Well I finished the book last night. It was a painful read as the opening pages stated the French were lazy and incompetent, the rest of the book was not much better. He made several comparisons to the efforts of the French in Indo-China to our coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. That itself had me set down the book for over a week. Despite some very sharp comments, the book did offer some interesting insight into the conflict although very little at the tactical level.

I'll put a few more detailed comments down after work.

Steven

[craigtx]

That's disappointing...

[slehman]

French Indochina Army Tactics and French Expeditionary Leadership by Breaker McCoy 2014, was somewhat of a tough read. While the editor quoted many respected sources, his personal opinions poisoned the reader's enjoyment of his work.

Within the introduction he states 'the French Army Officers were both unimaginative and suffering from low morale, Their apathy, stupidity and resignation enabled the communist enemy to retain the initiative at every level of communist growth. French leadership was as that observed in the US Army from 1995-2012, with the difference being the US ability to spend billions of US taxpayers dollars to bribe the media to make it appear that the US military was effective'.

General Navarres two phase strategy to remedy French problems and better coordinate the activities of the French units in Indochina were qualified by the author's statement 'It was a sucker plan to fool everyone, Navarre, a traitor, had come to destroy the French Army in Indochina'.

Out of the 257 pages of information, the best bits of information for our level of engagements were as follows:

Withdrawals must be: well planned, rehearsed; have thorough briefings; and carrying a minimum load of equipment.

French combat intelligence was limited, unreliabe and usually too late to be useful.

When coming under contact the engaged forces must react by attacking instead of waiting for the enemy attack.

Bivis must be selected and occupied no more than one hour before nightfall.

When moving across jungle borders, movement should be done at night to avoid detection from enemy sentries.

False trails should be created by conducting a left face, marching 100 metres and then resuming the march direction.

Commando operations were successful when using exact information, very detailed and secret preparation, and speed in execution.

French training deficiencies were mainly physical training, combat seasoning and combat firing aptitude.

Platoons routinely consisted of one firing section made up of two rifle detts and two shock sections with two teams of grenadiers-light infantrymen each.

Not really much to be gained from this publication. The book is available from www.quikmaneuvers.com

Steven

[toussant]

I think perhaps some of the battlefield tactics learned in the field by U.S. Special Forces might be useful to give some concise pointers as well- I know, I know it's after the time period, but lessons learned in the field could be universal amongst the seasoned veteran jungle troops and the native allies. The titles I have are "Special Forces: Combat Recon Manual Republic of Vietnam POI 7658, Patrolling FTX", "Professional Knowledge 1965-1966 NAVMC 2614", "Special Forces Handbook ST31-180", and the earliest field manual from Sept. 1961; "Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations FM 31-21". I like the first title in particular because it is concise (32 pp.), easy to read, and common sense lessons learned by soldiers who patrolled and were successful and lived to tell about their experiences. I think adapting the tactics to earlier weaponry and equipment might still give reenactors some pointers on patrolling in the Indochina environment. What do others think?
---Toussant

[slehman]

Some of the information in these earlier pams contain timeless information. I wonder how many of the French tactical lessons were relearned from the Pacific war against the Japanese.

In the Canadian military we used to say that there are no new lesson plans, just updated ones.

Steven