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Post by Legion Etrangere on Feb 21, 2012 23:08:35 GMT -5
This is turning into an incredible read. I like Morgan's use of the 1955 investigation into DBP as post-mortem analysis every couple of paragraphs. You instantly get an idea of the problematic nature of command and logistics. I never knew that de Castries had rescinded his order to retake Gabrielle and instead turned it into a linking operation between what was left in the CR and what Hervoet's tanks and the BPVN were able to link up with. A classical case of poor leadership (at least from the perspective of Morgan's book). Not to mention the professional hatred between Langlais and de Castries. I like the way Morgan writes. It's simple, but with a touch of perferated acidic humor; whenever he gets a chance he provides some type of candor about the situation at hand or humorous anecdote. I found this incredible: "... the survivors off Gabrielle who had been at Stalingrad said it was like Stalingrad. The Algerians who were at Monte Cassino said it was like Monte Cassino." Attachments:
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Post by hoover on Feb 22, 2012 13:15:19 GMT -5
I don´t know this book yet.
When it was published (so on what years the information are founding?)
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Post by Legion Etrangere on Feb 22, 2012 17:55:34 GMT -5
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Post by hoover on Feb 28, 2012 16:09:50 GMT -5
Got my copy today! First look: Impressive! 30 € including shipping. Seems to be worth the money.
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Post by Legion Etrangere on Feb 28, 2012 17:36:46 GMT -5
Hoover,
Good deal. I think you might find some interesting things in there, that didnt appear in either Roy or Fall's account (unless you count the footnotes). I like Morgan's use of the 1955 inquiry as fallback to various decisions made during the course of the battle. Its a horrific case of Monday-morning quarterbacking, but a damn good use of the material!
Mick
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